SECTION
10: FILIPINIZATION
REPUBLIC
VS. CA 299 SCRA 199
FACTS:
Respondent
Angel T. Yu filed a petition for registration of a parcel of land, designated
as Lot 524, situated at Estancia, Iloilo. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City rendered judgment confirming the title of the herein respondent,
Angel T. Yu. The said decision become final and executory. However, on 22 June
1995, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) received a letter from the
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) stating that an investigation was conducted on the instant
case, and it was found that there were grounds for opposition to the
respondent's land application since the land investigator who conducted an
ocular inspection of the subject land found the same to be a reclaimed
foreshore area. Thus, the Republic filed a petition for the annulment of
judgment with the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed by the latter. It
ruled, among others, that Lot 524 is not a foreshore land but an agricultural
land. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON
FORESHORE LAND IS CAPABLE OF PRIVATIZATION
DISPOSITION:
PETITION
GRANTED.
HELD:
The
Court ruled that foreshore land is part of the alienable land of the public
domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land
remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not
capable of private appropriation.
JG
SUMMIT INC VS CA (NOVEMBER 20, 2000)
FACTS:
Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Ltd., a Japanese corporation, entered into a joint venture
with the government's National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC)
for the construction, operation and management of a public utility, the Subic
National Shipyard, Inc, now Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO), with the parties given the right of first refusal. The government's
share in PHILSECO was increased to 97.41% leaving Kawasaki's share to 2.59%.
The APT, as trustee for the government, offered for sale its 87.67% share in
PHILSECO giving KAWASAKI the right to top by 5% the highest bid in
"exchange" for its right of first refusal and can designate a company
which could exercise said right. The consortium, composed of petitioner and two
other foreign corporations, was declared the highest bidder at P2.03 billion.
Nonetheless, KAWASAKI's designated company, PHI consortium, paid the purchase
price and a stock purchase agreement thereafter issued in its favor. Petitioner
challenged the same by a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in ruling that the right of first refusal and the right to top
are prima facie legal and that petitioner is in estoppel, dismissed the
petition. Hence, this recourse of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECO’s stocks
DISPOSITION:
review
on certiorari is GRANTED
HELD:
As
a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation,
there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the
capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.
Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its
right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus,
Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture
on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.
SECTION
11: PUBLIC UTILITIES
BAGATSING
VS COMMITTEE (1995)
FACTS:
PETRON
was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a
subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc.
In
1973, at the height of the world-wide oil crisis brought about by the Middle
East conflicts, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC. ESSO
became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON
and as a subsidiary of PNOC.
The
petition asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stop
respondents from selling the 40% block to a foreign buyer.
Petitioners
contend that PETRON is a public utility, in which foreign ownership of its
equity shall not exceed 40% thereof and the foreign participation in the
governing body shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital.
According to petitioners, ARAMCO is entitled only to a maximum of four seats in
the ten-man board but was given five seats.
ISSUE:
WON
PETRON IS A PUBLIC UTILITY
HELD:
A
"public utility" under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is
one organized "for hire or compensation" to serve the public, which
is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is not engaged in oil refining
for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties. Therefore, it is
not considered a public utility,
ALBANO
VS REYES
FACTS:
The
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare
for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A Bidding
Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of
several bids, the Bidding Committee recommended the award of the contract to
respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly,
Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the
winning bidder.
On
May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with
directives that PPA shall still have the responsibility for planning, detailed
engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of
the port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system
shall be allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes
and duties except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.
Petitioner
Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and
claimed that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative
franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.
ISSUE:
Whether
a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT
DISPOSITION:
DISMISSED
HELD:
No.
While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and
operation of the MICT and to undertake the providing of cargo handling and port
related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in accordance
with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly
empowers the PPA to provide services within Port Districts “whether on its own,
by contract, or otherwise”.
Even
if the MICT be considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily
call for a franchise from the legislature because the law has granted certain
administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the
operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is
clear that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the
operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and
management by another by contract or other means, at its option.
Doctrine: The
law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for the
operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a “wharf” or a “dock”, as
contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a
franchise from the Legislative Branch.
TATAD VS GARCIA
FACTS:
In 1989, the government planned to build a
railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made but certain corporations
were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT
Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An
agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement
was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957,
amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the
facilities.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña,
and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation of said agreement as they averred
that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under
Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA
railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The
petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.
ISSUE:
WON A FOREINER MAY WN ASSETS OF A PUBLIC UTILITY
CORPORATION?
DISPOSITION:
Dismissed
HELD:
A
foreign corporation could construct and own the facilities for a light rail
transit system but it may not be given the franchise to operate the system.
TELECOM VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Section
11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air
time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners
challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it takes property without
due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election.
ISSUE:
WON
THE GMA INC IS GIVEN HAS THE PRIVILEDGE OF PUBLIC SERVICE
DISPOSITION:
DISMISSED
RATIO:
All
broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Article XII, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. This provision authorizes the amendment of franchises for the
common good. In this case, the common good involved is for the voters who
have the right to be fully informed of the issues in an election.
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS VS CA
FACTS:
Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Ltd., a Japanese corporation, entered into a joint venture
with the government's National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC)
for the construction, operation and management of a public utility, the Subic
National Shipyard, Inc, now Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO), with the parties given the right of first refusal. The government's
share in PHILSECO was increased to 97.41% leaving Kawasaki's share to 2.59%.
The APT, as trustee for the government, offered for sale its 87.67% share in
PHILSECO giving KAWASAKI the right to top by 5% the highest bid in
"exchange" for its right of first refusal and can designate a company
which could exercise said right. The consortium, composed of petitioner and two
other foreign corporations, was declared the highest bidder at P2.03 billion.
Nonetheless, KAWASAKI's designated company, PHI consortium, paid the purchase
price and a stock purchase agreement thereafter issued in its favor. Petitioner
challenged the same by a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in ruling that the right of first refusal and the right to top
are prima facie legal and that petitioner is in estoppel, dismissed the
petition. Hence, this recourse of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility
DISPOSTION:
Petition was granted and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside.
HELD
Under
the Constitution, the operation of shipbuilding and ship repair industry is a public
utility which may be granted only to Filipino citizens or associations
organized under Philippine laws at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. The participation of foreign investors is limited to their
proportionate maximum share of 40%. Allowing a foreign corporation to
participate in a public bidding in the sale of a public utility beyond its
authorized share is unconstitutional.
REPUBLIC VS EXPRESS TELECOM
FACTS:
International
Communications Corporation (now Bayantel) filed an application with the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public
Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain Cellular
Mobile Telephone Service (CMTS). But before Bayantel could complete
presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an order to archive the case
without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency
became available. In later years, the NTC issued memorandum circulars
reallocating additional frequencies for CMTS, hence, Bayantel filed an ex-parte
motion to revive its case citing availability of new frequency bands. The NTC
granted the motion. Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)
filed its opposition and prayed for the dismissal of the application. The NTC,
however, favored Bayantel by granting a provisional authority to operate CMTS.
Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision annulling the orders of
the NTC. Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
decision. The NTC also filed its own motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals denied all the motions, hence, the NTC filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON
NTC RULES CMTS
DISPOSITION
SET
ASIDE
HELD:
the
NTC has the sole authority to issue the CPCN for the installation, operation,
and maintenance of communications facilities, and such power includes the
authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude
in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative
functions. In the case at bar, the Court found no cogent reason to disturb the
factual findings of the NTC which formed the basis for the awarding of the
provisional authority to Bayantel.
DEL MAR VS PAGCOR
FACTS:
PAGCOR filed a
motion for reconsideration seeking to reverse the decision of the court which
enjoined(cease and desist order; prohibit) PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them
for that purpose
ISSUE:
WON PAGCOR HAS
A FRANCHISE TO OPERTE JALAI ALAI
HELD
the
Court resolved (a) to partially grant the motions for clarification insofar as
it is prayed that Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) has a
valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other
person or entity), operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai, and
(b) to deny the motions insofar as respondents would also seek a
reconsideration of the Court's decision of 29 November 2000 that has, since
then, (i) enjoined the continued operation, maintenance, and/or management of
jai-alai games by PAGCOR in association with its co-respondents Belle Jai-Alai
Corporation and/or Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation and
(ii) held to be without force and effect the agreement of 17 June 1999 among
said respondents.
PTC VS NTC
FACTS:
Petitioner
Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals seeking the nullification of the Order of respondent National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) which granted respondent International
Communications Corporation (ICC) Provisional Authority (PA) to construct, operate
and maintain local exchange services in some of the areas already covered by
petitioner's Provisional Authority. Among other things, petitioner contended
that the Order of the respondent is tantamount to confiscation of property
without due process of law. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON
NTC Order provides for the basis of the issuance of the PA
DISPOSITION:
DENIED
HELD
Petitioner gravely failed to show that this exception applies to the instant case. Moreover, the exercise of administrative discretion, such as the issuance of a PA, is a policy decision and a matter that the NTC can best discharge, not the courts. Furthermore, under the Constitution, no franchisee can demand or acquire exclusivity in the operation of a public utility. Thus, a franchisee of a public authority cannot complain of seizure or taking of property because of the issuance of another franchise to a competitor. Petitioner, therefore, cannot complain of a taking of an exclusive right that it does not own and which no franchisee can ever own. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's petition not only because it failed to exhaust available administrative remedies but also because the respondent NTC acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Order.
Petitioner gravely failed to show that this exception applies to the instant case. Moreover, the exercise of administrative discretion, such as the issuance of a PA, is a policy decision and a matter that the NTC can best discharge, not the courts. Furthermore, under the Constitution, no franchisee can demand or acquire exclusivity in the operation of a public utility. Thus, a franchisee of a public authority cannot complain of seizure or taking of property because of the issuance of another franchise to a competitor. Petitioner, therefore, cannot complain of a taking of an exclusive right that it does not own and which no franchisee can ever own. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's petition not only because it failed to exhaust available administrative remedies but also because the respondent NTC acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Order.
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